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ABSTRACT 
This paper is a description and an analysis of trade liberalization under CAFTA.  
It shows that in the short run the impact of the agreement is likely to be small.  That is 
partly because the pre-CAFTA tariff levels were already low and also for sensitive 
products in agriculture, tariff reductions either quite gradual or non-existent.  CAFTA 
also granted tariff-free access for certain amounts of several important products.   
However these quotas are either lass than the current level of imports or small relative to 
domestic supply which means that they are unlikely to have much impact on domestic 
prices or producers.   
Since the U.S. already grants tariff-free access under the CBI,  trade liberalization 
in the CAFTA treaty appears to be asymmetric, with most of the tariff reductions being 
granted by the Central American countries. That is misleading for two reasons.  First 
there really were some significant tariff barriers in the United States for agricultural 
commodities under the CBI.  Many of these are removed under CAFTA. Second, the 
current favorable special treatment of the five Central American countries under the 
CBTPA and the CBI will expire in 2008 if CAFTA is not implemented. CAFTA makes 
permanent the tariff concessions of the CBI and the liberalized rules of origin of the 
CBTPA. That is particularly important for the maquila industry. CAFTA does not 
represent much of a change from current arrangements, but it does represent significant 
trade liberalization relative to what the situation might otherwise be after 2008 when the 
CBTPA has expired. 
The fact that the tariff reductions and TRQs granted by the Central American 
countries under CAFTA will not cause significant price reductions does not mean that 
domestic producers will be unaffected by the agreement.  In the long run the level of 
protection of many important commodities such as rice, pork and poultry will be 
significantly lower. But the tariff reductions in these sectors are gradual. That gives 
farmers time to adjust and to become more competitive.  What will be critical from a   viii
policy perspective is that this time is used wisely to increase productivity, switch to more 
profitable crops and take advantage of the new opportunities opened up by CAFTA. 
 
 
 TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER CAFTA:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE AGREEMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 







The Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is an ambitious attempt to 
meld the markets and interests of the United States with those of the five Central 
American countries and the Dominican Republic.  The treaty is an expression of the 
belief that removing barriers to trade and investment is the surest way to raise income and 
enhance growth prospects in developing countries.  The treaty determines the time path 
of trade liberalization between the United States and each of the Central American 
trading partners as well as rules regarding the treatment of foreign direct investment, 
intellectual property rights, labor rights, environment and conflict resolution. 
The proposed treaty has ignited a contentious debate both in the United States and 
Central America about the impact it will have on farmers, poverty, the environment and 
on the development prospects in the countries of Central America.  The treaty will bring 
significant trade liberalization for both industrial and agricultural commodities in Central 
America. But there are widespread fears that this could cause significant hardships 
particularly for smallholders by exposing them to low-cost and subsidized agricultural 
products from the United States.  Many in the region also feel that their countries have 
been too generous in the proposed treatment of foreign investment and the environment.  
This paper is the first of a set of studies which will attempt to analyze some of the issues 
raised by CAFTA.  It will focus on the changes in tariffs in agriculture and in processed 
agricultural commodities, the likely impact of these changes on domestic prices in 
Central America and the effect on producers in Central America of the reductions in 
protection in the United States contained in the CAFTA agreement.   
                                                 
1 Sam Morley is a Visiting Research Fellow at IFPRI’s Development Strategy and Governance Division. 
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In section one of the paper we summarize the main components of the CAFTA 
agreement.  We use disaggregated tariff data and the classification of products in the 
agreement to make an estimate of both the level and the rate of change of protection for 
agricultural and processed agricultural commodities.  We pay particularly close attention 
to the changes in the level of protection for certain commodities such as beans, corn and 
rice which are important for the poor either because they are big components in their food 
baskets or because they provide significant employment for small farmers.     In section 
two we look at changes in tariffs and quotas in the United States and their likely effect on 
producers in Central America.  There are three areas of interest:  first the effect of 
liberalized quotas for commodities such as sugar and beef, second the impact of CAFTA 
on the increasingly important maquila
2 sector and third, the effect of tariff reductions for 
products for products for which Central American producers have already had success in 
exporting to Europe and the rest of the World, but not in the United States.  These are 
sectors in which improved access to the U.S. market will expand the export potential of 
products in which Central American producers have already shown that they are 
competitive in the rest of the world.  Our purpose in each of these sections is mainly 
descriptive.  The paper will describe the changes in tariff protection under CAFTA 
highlighting those of particular interest o farmers and those for which CAFTA represents 
a significant change from the current situation. 
 
                                                 
2 Maquila refers to the clothing industry that assembles finished clothin from inputs that are generally 
imported.   11
II.  THE CAFTA AGREEMENT:  WHAT DOES IT CHANGE  
AND HOW IMPORTANT IS THIS LIKELY TO BE? 
In order to put the CAFTA agreement into context, we first summarize the 
relevant conditions of previous trade agreements between the US and the five Central 
American countries.  These establish the base from which CAFTA departs.  The five 
Central American countries are part of the so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
proposed by President Ronald Reagan in February 1982 as part of a more comprehensive 
foreign policy program "to promote economic revitalization and facilitate expansion of 
economic opportunity in the Caribbean Basin region." The CBI trade preferences and 
other benefits were granted to the countries of the region by the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) enacted in 1983 and put into effect beginning January 
1, 1984. 
The CBERA granted unilateral preferential treatment (duty-free or lower than 
applicable preferential tariffs) to many products imported into the United States from 24 
countries in the Caribbean Basin designated as beneficiaries.  Some significant tariff and 
phytosanitary barriers to Central American exports of agricultural commodities were left 
in place, as we shall see in our discussion of the changes in protection in the US under 
CAFTA.   Eligible for duty-free treatment under CBERA are all otherwise dutiable 
products except: textiles and apparel subject to textile agreements, as well as footwear 
ineligible for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as of January 1, 1984, canned 
tuna, petroleum and its products, and watches and watch parts containing any material 
originating in countries denied the most-favored-nation (MFN) status.   
It is important to note that duty free entry into the US market was not granted 
permanently under the CBERA.  If the CAFTA agreement is not implemented 
successfully that access is scheduled to expire in 2008. CAFTA makes duty-free access to 
the US market permanent.  This should be kept in mind when constructing CAFTA 
counterfactuals.  Comparing tariff rates in the United States pre and post CAFTA is 
incorrect.  Rather for the United States one should compare the CAFTA tariffs to what 
the tariffs would be in the absence of the CBERA.     12
Textiles were not given special tariff-free access to the US market under the 
CBERA.  However they were exempted from the world-wide quota system then in place 
provided that they were produced from inputs produced in the United States.  Under the 
CBERA the US granted identical trade and tariff treatment of textiles from both Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin countries. Both were accorded MFN treatment (non-
discriminatory treatment), both were eligible for tariff benefits under the "production 
sharing" program (a program highly used by US companies), and both were GSP 
beneficiaries.  That changed in 1990 with the passage of the Caribbean Economic 
Recovery Expansion Act (CBEREA).  It reduced tariffs for the Caribbean and Central 
American countries by 20% over a five year period with a 2.5% floor.  Thus between 
1990 and the implementation of  NAFTA, the Central American countries enjoyed 
significant advantages over Mexico  because of lower US tariffs.   
NAFTA which entered in force on January 1, 1994 changed the position of 
maquila in Central America.  An unintended side effect of the agreement was that the 
initial advantages of CBEREA beneficiary countries over Mexico was virtually 
eliminated because Mexican products now entered the US duty free. To make matters 
worse for Central American producers of maquila, Mexican producers were not subject to 
the restrictive rules of origin on intermediate inputs. To offset this unintended and 
unfavorable effect of NAFTA on Central America, in 2000 the United States-Caribbean 
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) was passed.  CBTPA beneficiary products include 
all textile and apparel products, footwear, tuna, petroleum and petroleum products, and 
watches and watch parts. Textile and apparel products are the centerpieces of the new 
legislation. They were granted the same duty free access to the US market and liberalized 
rules of origin granted to Mexico under NAFTA.  This has provided a big impetus to the 
growth of the maquila industry in all of the Central American countries as we will see.   
There is a catch however and that is that the CBTPA like the CBI unless renewed or 
supplanted by either CAFTA or a full Latin American Free Trade area, is scheduled to 
expire in 2008.  It is a unilateral, discretional and temporary agreement which the United 
States could terminate or change at any time or which it could allow to expire by doing   13
nothing.  These facts and this deadline were very much on the minds of the Central 
American negotiators of the CAFTA agreement. 
3  
Trade Liberalization under CAFTA:   
In order to appreciate how big the impact of CAFTA is likely to be, it is useful to 
look first at how much protection there was prior to CAFTA.  We show a recent estimate 
of the average level of tariffs and tariff dispersion for several years in the 1990s in table 
one. As the reader can see, tariffs have been significantly reduced everywhere, but 
particularly in Costa Rica and Honduras. Trade liberalization, a key component of the 
reform agenda, significantly lowered trade barriers during the 1990s in each of the 
Central American countries, with the possible exception of Nicaragua, where the data for 
1990 are somewhat suspect.
4  The implication of this is that trade liberalization under 
CAFTA  cannot be too significant on average.  But it could still be very important is 
particular sectors or commodities where tariffs remained high prior to CAFTA.  To get a 
sense of how important that could be one has to look at the disaggregated tariff data in 
detail.  That is what we will do in the next several sections of this paper. 
The CAFTA agreement is a treaty which spells out in great detail how the United 
States and the five countries of the region, and now the Dominican Republic as well will 
move toward a trading system that, with some significant exceptions such as sugar, is free 
of tariffs and other trade barriers.  As written, the treaty has been formally approved by  
El Salvador, the Dominican Republic Guatemala Nicaragua Honduras and the United 
States and is being debated by Costa Rica. (as of January 2006). Our analysis will be with 
the treaty as written for the Central American countries and the United States.  The treaty 
should be thought of as a collection of bilateral free trade agreements between the six 
countries and the United States.  It does not change the existing trade arrangements 
between the Central American countries, and in fact could well be a step backward for a 
                                                 
3 The section on previous trade agreements in the region draws heavily on Dypski (2002) and on  a release 
from the embassy of El Salvador called background of the new CBI legislation.”   
4 In Nicaragua the average tariff level was 21% in 1987, 8% in 1990 and 17.4% in 1994.  Those variations 
have more to do with the changes in the composition of imports over those years than increases and 
decreases in tariff rates.     14
potential Central American Common Market because there could be trade diversion away 
from intraregional trade to imports from the United States at a zero tariff.  The treaty 
could also result in an apparent increase in intraregional trade in which imports from the 
United States to the lowest tariff country are transhipped to other countries in the region.
5  
If that happens rising intraregional trade would not imply rising intraregional production.   
Table 1.  Average Tariff Levels and Dispersion in Central America by Country 
and Year 
  1990 1995 1997 1999 
Tariff  Levels      
Costa  Rica  16.4  11.2 9.9 3.3 
El  Salvador  16 10.2 10.2  5.7 
Guatemala 16  12  11.4  7.6 
Honduras  41.9 9.7 9.7 8.1 
Nicaragua  8 10.7  6.9 10.9 
Tariff  Dispersion      
Costa  Rica  8.8 8.5 5.5 7.8 
El  Salvador  8.6 7.6 5.7 3.4 
Guatemala  8.6 7.5 6.3 4.4 
Honduras  21.8 7.5 5.4 7.8 
Nicaragua  4.6 7.4 4.8 7.3 
Source: Lederman et al. World Bank. 
 
The CAFTA treaty specifies precisely how tariffs on all commodities are going to 
be eliminated or reduced over time.  For each country the agreement contains a long and 
very detailed list of commodities with both the current most favored nation (MFN) tariff 
and a tariff category to which the commodity has been assigned.  These categories 
determine how fast tariffs will be reduced over time. The categories which are common 
to all five countries are shown in Table 2.  In addition there are separate categories for 
various products for which the liberalization process is handled differently in each 
country.  
 
                                                 
5 This trade pattern is called triangulation, and is a concern within the region.  The countries of the region 
have imposed requirements that there be some addition to value added in the exporting country within the 
region in order for the tariff-free access to be permitted by the importing country.     15
Table 2.  Tariff Categories Under CAFTA 
Category   Applies  to 
A  Immediate tariff reduction to zero  All  countries 
B  Linear reduction of tariffs to zero over five years  All  countries 
C  Linear reduction of tariffs over ten years.  All  countries 
D  Linear reduction of tariffs over fifteen years  All  countries 
E  Six Year grace period, then reduction of 33% over next 
four years, then full liberalization from 12
th to 15
th year. 
All  countries 
F  Ten year grace period, then linear reduction to zero over 
the next ten years. 
All  countries 
G  Goods in this category already have zero tariff rate  All  countries 
H  Goods in this category are excluded from tariff reductions 
under CAFTA, with tariffs remaining at the rates agreed 
to in WTO. 
All  countries 
M  Non-linear reduction in tariffs to zero.  2% in 1
st year, 8% 
per year from 3
rd to 6




All  countries 
N  Elimination of tariffs in 12 equal annual steps.  All  countries 
O  Six year grace period and then elimination in nine non-
linear steps, 40% from 7
th to 11





P  Ten year grace period, then elimination over 7 years.  33% 
from 11
th to the 14
th year and 67% from the 15




Q  Elimination over 15 years.  15% in 1
st year, 33% from the 
4
th to the 8
th year and 67% from 9
th to the 15
th year. 
ES,NI 
Source:  CAFTA-DR Treaty 
 
For a subset of sensitive agricultural products CAFTA also expands a system of 
tariff rate quotas (TRQ’s) originally set up under the WTO which define amounts of 
certain commodities that can be imported free of tariffs.
6  In addition for many products 
safeguard provisions permit a country to apply the MFN tariff level if imports from the 
US or in the case of the US, imports from Central America exceed the safeguard level.  
Safeguards are provisions permitted under WTO (and GATT) regulations by which 
imports beyond the safeguard level can be temporarily restricted if the affected industry 
                                                 
6 These are products that are politically sensitive and or produced or consumed by the poor.   16
can show that it will suffer serious injury from the level of imports beyond the safeguard 
level.  In most cases the safeguard level tariffs fall over time.   
Changes in the Protection of Agriculture based Products under CAFTA 
In Table 1 we displayed the level of tariffs averaged over all the separate 
commodity classes.  But that does not give the information we want on changes in the 
level of protection for agricultural commodities or processed agricultural commodities 
under CAFTA.  We now turn our attention to these changes.  As we pointed out above, 
under CAFTA commodities are divided into various categories according to the time 
profile of programmed tariff reductions under the agreement.  Table 3 shows the amount 
of trade in each of the tariff categories for all agricultural and processed agricultural 
products and the level and changes in the average tariff in each of the categories. For 
example in category A, tariffs are eliminated immediately while in B they are reduced to 
zero in five equal installments over the first five years and in C over the first ten years.  
Note that these averages are all weighted averages of individual tariff rates, where the 
weights are determined by the share of the commodity in total imports.  As is well known 
this method of averaging can seriously under estimate the average level of protection 
when there are tariffs so high that they choke off imports.  The last category in each table 
is comprised of all the commodities which have quotas other than those such as yellow 
corn which is shown separately for some countries.  In most countries the dominant 
commodity in the final quota line is rice.   
Table 3 gives a clear picture of where tariffs are significant, where they will be 
cut and over what time period.  The reader will note that except for Nicaragua all the 
average tariff levels are higher than those shown in Table 1.  That reflects the fact that the 
level of protection in agriculture is higher that in industry.  It also stems from the high 
level of imports and high-published tariff rates in the last or quota category in each of our 
five countries.  The averages in the table are calculated using the legal bound tariff rates 
for each commodity, not actual tariff collections. The quota category is almost entirely 
comprised of rice imports for which the tariff rates vary between 29% to over 60% in the   17
five countries.  We used the tariff rates in the table applied to the actual level of imports 
to calculate the hypothetical tariff collections by category.  But it not clear whether these 
rates were actually imposed, particularly for yellow corn.
7 Since imports and calculated 
tariffs in the quota category comprise such a high proportion of total imports and tariff 
collections and since there is a good deal of uncertainty on the tariff rate actually charged 
for these products, we recalculated the average tariff on all agricultural commodities 
other than rice and yellow corn.  Those tariffs are shown below the tariff rate for each 
country, and are in all cases substantially lower than the overall average tariff rates 
shown in the table itself, particularly in Guatemala and Honduras.  What this says is that 
apart from rice and corn, the average level of pre-CAFTA protection in agriculture was 
quite low, well below ten percent in all five countries.  Between 40% and 54% of 
agricultural imports were in category G on which tariffs were already zero before 
CAFTA.  In Costa Rica which did not have a category G, 70% of imports were in its 
category A where the average tariff was only 2.3% before CAFTA.  For all of these 
commodities, CAFTA does not represent any change in conditions.  This is important to 
keep in mind when thinking about the likely effect of CAFTA on agriculture.  
Tariffs in Categories A and B are either eliminated immediately or over the first 
five years of the agreement.  Products in these categories are broadly comprised of prime 
cuts of beef, fish, flowers, various fresh fruits and vegetables, potatoes, and inputs to 
processed food such as soups and dog food.  For the most part, these are not products in 
which US imports compete with local producers.  For fish, fruits and vegetables it is 
unlikely that US prices would be competitive with local product even at a zero tariff.  The 
picture in beef is more complicated.  Central American cattle growers do not now 
produce prime cuts of beef, so the increase in tariff-free imports should have little effect 
on local producers. In fact, because CAFTA grants beef import quotas in the U.S., the 
treaty is on balance likely to be favorable to them.   
                                                 
7 There are a number of trade reports that discuss actual tariff rates for yellow corn.  In Guatemala the rate 
was said to be 15% rather than the published rate of 35%, in Honduras, 20% rather that 45%, and in 
Nicaragua a zero tariff on imports at the WTO TRQ which was higher than actual imports.   Table 3.  Agriculture and Processed Food Tariffs by Tariff Class 
  Tariff Category  Trade  Average Tariif 
El Salvador  Imports  Exports  No. prod  Pre CAFTA First year 5th year  10th year  15th year
  A  18,836  1,055  398  13.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
  B  9,376 898 141  12.85%  10.28%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
 C  17,553  7,614  153 15.33% 13.80%  7.68%  0.00% 0.00% 
 D  6,249  34,825  89 18.24% 16.96% 12.17%  6.07% 0.00% 
  G  146,154  576  245 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
 N  2,135  335  17 21.18% 19.49% 12.36%  3.53% 0.00% 
 Yellow  corn  48,854  0  1 15.00% 15.00% 15.00%  9.00% 0.00% 
 White  corn  644  0  1 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%  20.00% 
 Quota  19,276  42  42 38.58% 38.50% 38.50% 38.50%  25.68% 
 total  268,433          8.53% 7.35% 6.43% 4.62%  1.89% 
Costa Rica    
  A  202,155  563,697  519 2.33%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
 B  9,613  124,921  104 10.77%  8.62%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
 C  10,910  7,121  151 15.12%  13.61%  7.57%  0.00% 0.00% 
 D  22,653  131,168  216 15.21%  14.15%  10.15%  5.07% 0.00% 
 F  16  188  3 66.00%  66.00%  66.00% 66.00%  33.00% 
 N  16,655  6,226  34 14.55%  13.39%  8.49%  2.43% 0.00% 
  S  1,826 1 9  12.76%  12.76%  12.76%  7.66%  0.00% 
 T  956 13,463  4 15.00%  15.00%  13.50%  7.50% 0.00% 
 Quota  23,805  594  34 37.85%  37.85%  37.85% 37.85%  22.71% 
 total  288,589        7.85%  5.94%  5.41%  3.71%  1.87% 
 without  rice           4.99%             
Guatemala              
  A  98,554  247,504  451 8.98%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
 B  25,057 17,175  105 14.96%  11.97%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
 C  38,423 12,777  144 13.90%  12.51%  6.95%  0.00% 0.00% 
 D  11,772  197,898  93 12.14%  11.29%  8.09%  4.04% 0.00% 
  F  47 0 4  15.00%  15.00%  15.00%  15.00%  7.50% 
  G  187,038 23,875  248 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
 N  123  706  4 17.52%  16.12%  10.22%  2.92% 0.00% 
  O  2,110 2 1  20.00%  20.00%  20.00%  12.00%  0.00% 
 Quota  101,893  177  40 44.07%  39.20%  15.07%  5.30% 0.00% 
 total  465,017        13.92%  10.65%  4.18%  1.32%  0.00% 
  total without rice and yellow corn        6.62%             
Honduras              
 A  26,000  192,298  365 12.66%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
 B  5,908 30,360  124 13.98%  11.19%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
 C  15,670  9,227  175 16.57%  14.92%  8.29%  0.00% 0.00% 
 D  16,685 50,656  137 14.73%  13.70%  9.82%  4.90% 0.00% 
 F  78  10  7 15.00%  15.00%  15.00% 15.00% 7.50% 
  G  107,545 830 235  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
 N  4,510  0  10 13.85%  12.74%  8.08%  2.31% 0.00% 
 O  869  379  4 15.00%  15.00%  15.00%  9.00% 0.00% 
 Quota  50,482  1,514  33 41.58%  41.58%  41.58% 41.58%  27.73% 
 total  227,747        13.58%  11.85%  10.73%  9.66%  6.15% 
  total without rice and yellow corn        7.20%             
Nicaragua              
 A  21,928  106,318  311 13.83%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
 B  5,467  7,189  190 14.40%  11.52%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
  C  7,422 375 205  14.24%  12.82%  7.12%  0.00%  0.00% 
 D  14,505 68,625  139 15.81%  14.70%  10.55%  5.26% 0.00% 
 F  22  370  11 33.18%  33.18%  33.18% 33.18%  16.59% 
  G  58,359 150 196  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
 N  5,608  655  27 11.56%  10.64%  6.74%  1.93% 0.00% 
 Q  88 46,426  10 30.00%  4.50%  3.91%  1.03% 0.00% 
 Quota  10,751  2,096  39 36.55%  36.55%  33.99% 32.90%  18.50% 
 total  124,150        9.49%  6.65%  4.91%  3.56%  1.60% 
  total without yellow corn and rice        8.69%             
Source:  Worksheets made available by CEPAL, Mexico 
Note:  The import and export levels are for 2002.  The quota category includes all commodities with TRQs.   19
Category C commodities are those with a ten-year linear tariff reduction schedule.  
This group is comprised primarily of processed foods and in the case of Guatemala, 
frozen meat in addition to processed food.  D and F category commodities have a very 
gradual reduction of tariff protection over either 15 or 20 years (Table 2).  Thus whatever 
impact CAFTA will have on producers in these two categories will necessarily be quite 
drawn out.  The bulk of D category products are what could be called processed 
agricultural commodities such as animal or vegetable fats, candies and products made 
from sugar, products made from chocolate, leather, flour, beverages and products made 
from vegetables or fruits.  In Honduras the category also includes also potatoes and some 
beans.  The F category where there is a ten-year grace period followed by ten-year tariff 
elimination is used in four of the countries and is comprised completely of dairy 
products.   
Tariff Reductions for Sensitive Commodities 
Certain commodities like beans, corn and rice are of particular importance to 
either the income or the consumption of the poor.  We have used the information on tariff 
categories and initial tariffs in table two to calculate the time path of tariff reductions for 
a number of these “sensitive” commodities and show the results in Table 4.  Note that the 
table shows only the tariff level, not the impact of quotas which we will discuss in a 
moment.   
Other than white corn in several countries, tariff protection for all of these 
sensitive products will disappear over twenty years.  But for most products, the 
liberalization will be very gradual, much of it occurring at least ten years after the treaty 
goes into effect. This is important.  In Central America many have protested that CAFTA 
will hurt small farmers by reducing protection of commodities of particular importance to 
smallholders and the poor. The evidence in the table makes it quite clear that this will not 
the case, at least for the first five to ten years.  It seems that the Central American 
negotiators of CAFTA were not willing to impose shock treatment on their producers of 
these sensitive commodities.  But it is also clear that over the long run, the reductions in    20
Table 4.  Tariff Reductions Over Time for Selected Sensitive Products
8 
    Yellow Corn White Corn Rice  Beans Beef Pork  Poultry Dairy 
Costa Rica            
  initial  0.01  0.15 0.36 0.15 0.15 0.47 0.79 0.53 
  year  one  0.00  0.14 0.36 0.14 0.14 0.47 0.54 0.52 
  year  five  0.00  0.00 0.36 0.09 0.00 0.47 0.39 0.47 
  year  ten  0.00  0.00 0.36 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.42 
  year  fifteen  0.00  0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.18 
  year  twenty  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
El Salvador            
  initial  0.15  0.20 0.40 0.15 0.15 0.40 0.37 0.00 
  year  one  0.15  0.20 0.40 0.12 0.00 0.40 0.31 0.00 
  year  five  0.15  0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.00 
  year  ten  0.10  0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.23 0.00 
  year  fifteen  0.00  0.20 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
  year  twenty  0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Guatemala            
  initial  0.35  0.20 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.90 0.14 
  year  one  0.32  0.20 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.86 0.13 
  year  five  0.18  0.20 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.82 0.13 
  year  ten  0.00  0.20 0.29 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.82 0.13 
  year  fifteen  0.00  0.20 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.06 
  year  twenty  0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Honduras            
  initial  0.45  0.45 0.45 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.55 0.12 
  year  one  0.45  0.45 0.45 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.52 0.12 
  year  five  0.45  0.45 0.45 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.45 0.12 
  year  ten  0.30  0.45 0.45 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.41 0.11 
  year  fifteen  0.00  0.45 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.05 
  year  twenty  0.00  0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nicaragua            
  initial  0.15  0.10 0.62 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.70 0.34 
  year  one  0.15  0.10 0.62 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.67 0.32 
  year  five  0.15  0.10 0.62 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.55 0.32 
  year  ten  0.10  0.07 0.62 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.55 0.31 
  year  fifteen  0.00  0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.15 
  year  twenty  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source:  CEPAL tariff worksheets, and CAFTA treaty   
 
                                                 
8 Our estimate of protection for poultry is heavily affected by very high tariff rates on chicken legs which 
are intended to offset US willingness to sell this commodity at a very low cost because it is less desirable in 
the US market   21
tariffs for these commodities are considerable.  Domestic producers are given a fairly 
long time to adopt new crops or new and more efficient production techniques.  But in 
the long run, they will have to adjust to a far lower level of protection, particularly in rice, 
beans, poultry and dairy.   
The table also makes clear the high level of protection afforded to domestic 
producers of sensitive products, particularly dairy, poultry and rice.  This pattern may, at 
least to some extent reflect the desire by the Central American governments to protect 
their producers from subsidized exports from the United States.  A recent study estimated 
that subsidies in the US amounted to 41% of the value of production of rice, 50% for 
milk and 32% for corn.
9   
 
                                                 
9 Monge et al (2004).   22
II. THE  TREATMENT  OF QUOTA COMMODITIES 
There are three types of commodities where CAFTA potentially could have a 
large and immediate impact, namely those in categories A and B where whatever 
protection there was pre-CAFTA falls rapidly to zero, and the special quota commodities 
where under CAFTA a certain quantity of imports will be permitted to enter free of 
tariffs. These are the products with the highest average tariff levels and comprise between 
10% and 25% of total imports in the five countries.  As we have already indicated, the A 
and B category imports are primarily those which do not compete with local producers.   
We now look more closely at the special subclass of commodities which were granted 
tariff-free import quotas.   
Certain commodities of particular importance to the poor, either as consumers or 
producers, were given special treatment under CAFTA.  Tariffs for these commodities 
were typically quite high prior to CAFTA, and the rate of tariff reduction under CAFTA 
in most cases will be slow as shown in Tables 3 and 4.  But CAFTA also established 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for each signatory in many of these commodities making 
possible faster liberalization that is apparent from the tariff category in which these 
commodities were placed.  These are the commodities in which CAFTA could have a 
significant effect in the short run since it permits tariff-free imports up to certain 
quantitative limit as soon as the treaty is implemented (or in the case of chicken legs, in 
year three). We now look at the most important of these commodities and then ask what 
is the impact of the TRQs likely to be in practice.   
A summary of the CAFTA TRQs and safeguards is displayed in Table 5.  Note 
that for dairy products and meat there are separate quotas for many different 
commodities.  We show only the totals in the table.  For most products the TRQs grow 
over time and imports above the TRQ limit are subject to a tariff which falls over time 
according to the tariff category in which the commodity was placed.   For most of the 
commodities even those without quotas there are also safeguards.     23
Table 5.  Tariff Categories and Tariff Rate Quotas by Commodity and Country 
under CAFTA 




Growth in Quota Safeguard 
% of Quota 
Initial 
Tariff 
Costa Rica          
  Dairy  F  1050   5% per year  130%   15-66% 
  Rice unmilled  V  51000  1000 mt 
annually 
110% 36% 
 Rice-milled  V  5250  250  mt 
annually 
110% 36% 
  Chicken leg quarters   U  330   +90 mt 
annually 
130%   151% 
  Pork  R  1100  100 mt per 
year for first 5 
years, then 150 
mt per year for 
next 10 years. 
140% 47% 
  Potatoes  B,H  2931  5% per year  50 mt  47% 
  Onions  H  600  2% per year    47% 
  Black beans  D  ---  ---  1200 mt 
 
47% 
 White  beans  D  ---  ---    11% 
 Red  beans  D  ---  ---    47% 
El Salvador 
        
 Dairy  F  1070  5%  130%    15-40% 
 Rice-unmilled  P  62220  2%  ---  20% 
 Rice-milled  P  5625  2%  110%  40% 
 Yellow  Corn  O  367500  5%  ---  15% 
  White Corn  H  35700  2% per year to 
year 15, then 
700mt per year 
 20% 
  Chicken leg quarters  P  464 mt starting 
in year three 
+434 mts per 
year after year 
three 
130% 164.4% 
 Pork  O  1650  mt  10%  130%  40% 
 Beef  D  105  mt  5%  ---  15% 
 Sorghum  D  263  mt  5%  110%  15% 
 Black  beans  D  ---  ---  20% 
 White  beans  N  ---  ---  20% 




              24
 
  Commodity  Tariff 
Category
Initial Quota 
(in metric tons) 
Growth in Quota  Safeguard 




        
 Dairy  F  1292  5%  130%    15% 
 Rice-unmilled  P  54600  4.8%  110%    29.2% 
 Rice-milled  P  10500  5%  110%    29.2% 
 Yellow  Corn  C  525000  5%  ---  35% 
 White  Corn  H  20400  400 mt per year  ---  20% 
  Chicken leg quarters  P  21810 or 5% of 
national produc-
tion, whichever is 
bigger 
-1316 mt per 
year 
130% 164.4% 
 Pork  D  4148 5% 130%    15% 
 Beef  D  1060  5.7%  ---  15% 
 Black  beans  O  --- ---  20% 
 White  beans  C  --- ---  20% 





        
 Dairy  F  2202 5% 130%    15% 
 Rice-unmilled  P  91800  2%  110%    45% 
 Rice-milled  P  8925  5%  110%    45% 
 Yellow  Corn  E  190509  5%  ---  45% 
 White  Corn  H  23460  460 mt   ---  45% 
  Chicken leg quarters  P  534 starting in 
third year 
+534 mt per 
year 
130%   164.4% 
 Pork  O  2150  7%   130%   15% 
 Black  beans  D  ---  ---  ---  15% 
 White  Beans  B  ---  ---  ---  15% 
 Red  Beans  D  ---  ---  ---  15% 
Nicaragua 
        
 Dairy  F  1425  5%  130%    15-40% 
  Ice Cream  F  72815 ltr 5%  130%    40% 
 Rice-unmilled  P  92700  3%  110%    45% 
 Rice-milled  P  13650  5%  110%    62% 
  Yellow Corn  E  68250  5%  115%   15% 
  White Corn  H  5100  100 mt per year  ---  10% 
  Chicken leg quarters  P  317 mt starting in 
third year 
+317 mt per 
year 
130%   164.4 
  Pork  D  1100  100 mt per year  ---  15% 
 Black  beans  D  --- ---  30% 
 White  Beans  D  --- ---  10% 
 Red  Beans  D  --- --- 
700 mt 
30% 
Source:  CAFTA agreement 
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Before looking at the various commodities, consider the impact of a quota in the 
domestic market of a product protected by a high tariff.  We are primarily interested in 
the effect of the quota on domestic price and on domestic producers and consumers.  
Obviously there also a fiscal effect resulting from the loss of tariff revenue as well but we 
will ignore this.  It turns out that the effect we are interested in is ambiguous.  Whether or 
not a new quota has an effect on the domestic price depends on the size of the quota 
relative to previous imports, which in turn depends on the position of the domestic supply 
and demand curves.   
Consider Figure 1.  Domestic supply and demand curves prior to the quota are the 
solid lines DD and SS.  The world price is the horizontal line Pw and the domestic price 
of imports is the line Pw(1+t) where t is the tariff.  Absent the quota, domestic supply is 
OD, imports are DE and the internal market price of the commodity is P(1+t).  Suppose 
now that a tariff-free import quota in the amount AB is granted.  This shifts out the 
supply curve to the dashed line Sq  which now represents domestic supply plus duty–free 
imports.  Domestic supply is now OA plus BF.  But since BF is equal to AD, total 
production is unchanged. As the reader can see, the market-clearing price is also 
unchanged at Pw(1+t). Nor is there any change in total imports.  However AB is now 
imported tariff free, while FE is imported and pays the tariff.  Thus, for this particular 
situation the quota has no effect on either producers or consumers.  Its only effect is to 
transfer government tariff revenue to the holders of the quotas.
10     
This is not the only possible result.  Suppose that the domestic demand curve 
intersected the domestic supply curve at a price less than Pw .  There would then be no 
imports either before or after the quota, and the quota would as in the previous case have 
no effect, either on producers, consumers or government revenue.   The only 
circumstance in which the quota does have a price and production effect is if the quota is 
larger than the current level of imports. Suppose, for example that the quota is AG rather 
than AB.  In that case the supply curve shifts out to S’q.  Now domestic production is OA 
                                                 
10 This will undoubtedly make the distribution of income more unequal since the quota holds are likely to 
be wealthy to start with.     26
plus GH.  But GH is smaller than AD, so domestic supply contracts.  In this case the 
larger quota replaces some domestic production as well as all the pre quota imports at 
P(1+t).  Here the domestic price falls to P’and total consumption rises by EH.  Here 
consumers gain from the quota and producers lose.  To summarize, quotas only have an 
effect if they are larger than the amount previously imported.  In the tow other possible 
cases where either there are no imports or where the quota is smaller than previous 
imports, the quotas have no effect, either on price, producers or consumers.   
Figure 1.  The Effect of Quotas on the Domestic Goods Market 
 
With this discussion in mind we look now at the commodities which will have 
additional quotas under CAFTA (Table 6).  The four most important are yellow corn, 
rice, pork and dairy products.  In Table 6 we have added domestic production because 
even if quotas are large relative to imports, if both are small compared to domestic 
production, the impact of quotas on price and production will be small.  Conversely, if 
total production is small even relatively large quota effects will have small effects on 
total agricultural production or employment.  Table 6 allows us to compare the quotas, 
imports and domestic production for main TRQ commodities in our five countries.   27
Table 6.  Quotas and Imports from the United States by Commodity and Country (in metric tons) 
Country Costa  Rica  El  Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
Product  Initial 
Quota  Imports Prod’n.  Initial 
Quota  Imports Prod’n. Initial 
Quota  Imports Prod’n.  Initial 
Quota  Imports Prod’n. Initial 
Quota Imports Prod’n. 
rice,  unmilled 51000  158697  220361 62220 85676 35616 54600 57127 40714 91800  95573  7746  92700  105155 272974 
rice,  milled  5250  7   5625 1921    10500 1358   8925  2877    13650 5553     
yellow  corn      --        na 367500 381118  0 525000 516992 155000 190509  168928  0 68250  0  0 
white corn    --    na  35700  4499  604132  20400  9411  938730  23460  46098  485938  5100  6004  463806 
cheese  410 183  8079 410 618  2400 450 231  11250 410  894  9052  575  97  22500 
ice  cream  150  76   120  22   160 135   100  83   73  16     
other  dairy  140 243   120 174   182 377   140  114   50  3566     
powder  milk  200  9   300 664   400  5831   300 1712    650 605     
pork  1100  209  34565 1650  969 9160 4148 3388  25250 2150  2175 9828  1100  170  6158 
chicken  legs  330  221 83158  464*  129 78550 21810 14761  155000  534*  513 74000 317*  489  62273 
Source:  Angel and Hernandez, Angel (2005) and the CAFTA agreement.   
Note:  Imports are for 2003 except for rice in Nicaragua for which the average of 2000-2002 taken from US Rice Federation is used.    
Production figures are the average of 2000-2003, and taken from Todd, et. Al., Angel (2005) and directly from the FAO data base.  Note that the domestic production of chicken is a 
three year average 2001-2003 as is the production of corn in Guatemala.  both are taken from Angel (2005).  For chicken leg quarters, quotas with an asterisk start in year three. 
Imports of chicken legs and production of chicken are taken from Angel (2005).   
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Changes in Protection of Sensitive Commodities in the Short and Long Run 
Rice: In the short run CAFTA’s impact on rice prices will be through the TRQs shown in 
Table 5 since tariffs will not fall for at least ten years according to Table 4.  In Costa Rica 
and El Salvador the TRQs are both significantly less than the average level of imports, so 
it is unlikely that the prices for either consumers or producers will be affected by the 
change.  In Guatemala and Nicaragua the TRQ is much closer to the previous level of 
imports, but unless conditions change both countries are likely to continue importing 
quantities of rice above the TRQ which would imply that prices to producers at the 
margin would continue to be equal to the world price plus the pre-CAFTA tariff rate.  
Honduras has a slightly different situation.  Like Guatemala and Nicaragua it has set its 
TRQ to be about equal to the level of pre-CAFTA imports.  But unlike those two 
countries, its domestic production of rice is so small that even if prices were to fall 
because of the TRQ the negative effect on rice producers would be dwarfed by the 
positive effect of lower prices on consumers of rice.   
Thus to summarize, in the short run the most likely outcome for all five countries 
is that domestic rice prices are going to be unaffected by CAFTA.  If there is any effect it 
will be in Honduras.  But there, if there is any effect, it will be positive since the number 
of rice producers who could be hurt by a decline in prices is much smaller than the 
number of consumers who will be helped.  We also note that Central American 
negotiators must have been aware of the importance of rice, for not only did they 
establish quotas which were less than average imports in recent years, but they put rice in 
category P or U for which tariffs on out of quota imports will be unchanged for the first 
ten years, after which they are gradually liberalized.  They also set safeguard levels very 
close to the quota (110% of quota).  That will permit the authorities to take special steps 
to slow down or stop imports if they unexpectedly surge at some time in the future.  But 
one should emphasize here that this lack of impact is only in the short run.  Ten years out, 
domestic producers of rice in all four of the other countries are going to face a fairly 
severe decline in tariff protection and in all probability in prices (Table 4 for an estimate).    29
Corn:  Corn is a critical product because of its importance in the diet of the poor and in 
the output of small farmers.  How is it handled under CAFTA?  Here there is an 
important ambiguity to be cleared up at the outset.  For corn it is important to distinguish 
between white and yellow corn.  These two were clearly treated differently by 
negotiators.  In three of the countries white corn is virtually the only commodity which 
was exempted from any tariff reductions.  (It was put into tariff category H).  In Central 
America white corn is used for human consumption while yellow corn is primarily used 
in animal feed.  More important for our purposes yellow corn is only produced in 
Guatemala and possibly Costa Rica
11.  What corn is produced is white corn.  This must 
be why the negotiators of CAFTA permitted very large TRQs of yellow corn but very 
small ones of white corn.  If there is a big rise in the importation of yellow corn because 
of these new TRQs, that will not hurt corn producers even if the price of yellow corn falls 
unless consumers change their preferences. But if there is a price reduction, that will help 
domestic chicken and livestock producers for whom yellow corn is an input.  It will also 
hurt domestic producers of sorghum which is a substitute animal feed. (Angel, 2005). 
The key question is white corn. First Table 4 tells us that there will be no changes 
at all in tariffs for white corn in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and only limited 
changes for the first ten years in Nicaragua. Costa Rica put white corn into category D 
where   tariffs fall linearly over 15 years.  And, since the pre-CAFTA tariff on white corn 
was only 15%, CAFTA will have a price effect but it will be only 1 percentage point per 
year.  
The main impact of CAFTA on white corn producers will be through the TRQs 
shown in Table 5.  In El Salvador and Guatemala the white corn TRQ is significantly 
higher that pre-CAFTA imports.  Therefore we should expect domestic prices to decline.  
But how much they decline depends on the change in the total supply implied by the high 
TRQ imports.  That in turn depends on the level of domestic production.  When one looks 
at that in Table 6 for these two countries, ones sees that the TRQ implies only a small 
                                                 
11 See Angel (2005), table 2.  We have no information on yellow corn production in Costa Rica, however, 
the tariff rate for yellow corn in Costa Rica was 1% prior to CAFTA.      30
increase (2-5%) in the total supply of white corn to the domestic market.  That implies 
that while prices are likely to decline, the decline will be small. In the remaining two 
countries, Honduras and Nicaragua, not only are white corn TRQs less than or just equal 
to pre-CAFTA imports, but they are also small relative to total supply. We conclude that 
in no case will the CAFTA agreement have a significant effect on domestic prices, 
domestic producers or indeed on consumers.  That is true both in the short run and the 
long run. 
Pork:  CAFTA is likely to have a significant effect on pork producers in both the short 
and the long run.  For the first ten years the effect will be mainly through the TRQs 
which equal or exceed the current level of imports in all five countries and which are also 
a significant addition to domestic production-between 15-20% in El Salvador, Honduras, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Note however that the absolute level of tariffs is only 15% in 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which limits the impact that even generous TRQs 
can have in these three countries. In the long run, the reduction in tariffs will be more 
important than the TRQs in the two high tariff countries, Costa Rica and El Salvador, but 
in all five countries CAFTA will have a significant impact on domestic prices. 
Dairy:  For dairy products our information on local production is less complete than for 
the other commodities.  For cheese both the quotas and pre-CAFTA imports are small 
relative to total supply, so CAFTA-induced price changes are likely to be small.  We 
suspect that the situation is similar for other dairy products. One of the reasons that 
CAFTA is not likely to have a big effect is that for these products imports from the 
United States compete against the other big world dairy producers, the EU, New Zealand 
and Canada.  Pre CAFTA, the US share of dairy imports to Central America was only 10-
15%.   In addition whatever tariff protection there is for the particular products with 
quotas will not change rapidly.  All the dairy products with quotas are in category F 
where tariffs remain at their pre-CAFTA levels for ten years, and then fall gradually to 
zero over the next ten years.   
Beans:  Beans are one of the most sensitive products in agriculture, not only because they 
are an important product of small farmers, but also because of their role in the   31
consumption basket of the poor.  As the reader can see from Table 5, CAFTA is very 
cautious in its treatment of beans.  To start with, no country granted a tariff-free access 
(TRQ) to imported beans.  Nor did they permit a rapid reduction of WTO level tariffs.  
Guatemala is the one important exception.  It will eliminate its 15% tariff on red beans 
upon approval of the CAFTA agreement. Except for red beans in Guatemala, for most 
types of beans in all five countries tariffs will be only gradually reduced over 12-15 years 
which means that the tariffs will decline by 2-3 percentage points per year at most, and 
then only for imports from the United States, which has not previously been an important 
supplier of beans.   Furthermore, to guarantee that CAFTA would not cause any dramatic 
reduction in the price of beans, all the countries save Honduras imposed a very stringent 
or low level safeguard beyond which they would be permitted to revert to pre-CAFTA 
tariff levels.  With the exception of red beans in Guatemala, we conclude that the effect 
of CAFTA on the market for beans will be small, at least over the next ten years unless 
there is a significant relaxation of the safeguards. 
Poultry:  Chicken is also given a special treatment under CAFTA.  Chicken legs and 
hindquarters are among the most highly protected commodities in agriculture, with tariffs 
of 151% in   Costa Rica and 164.5% in the other four countries.  A very modest 
liberalization is programmed under CAFTA.  As shown in Table 5, chicken legs and 
hindquarters are in tariff reduction category P or U where there is a ten-year grace period 
and then gradual elimination of tariffs over the next eight years.  As the reader can see in 
Table 4, the average level of tariff protection is high for chicken meat imports and will 
not decline rapidly.  So in the short or medium run it is TRQs which will have the largest 
potential impact.  And since the tariffs are high for these commodities, TRQs could have 
a relatively large short run impact on domestic prices. Note that this TRQ applies only the 
chicken leg quarters.  They are given a special treatment because in the US market breast 
quarters are preferred so the leg quarters are exported at a low price. All five countries 
have TRQs, but as the reader can see, they are very small relative to the total domestic 
production of chicken.  All of this is the short run.  In the long run tariff protection will   32
completely disappear (Table 4) and that could have a very significant effect on domestic 
producers.   
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III. TRADE  LIBERALIZATION IN THE U.S. MARKET 
We now turn to the other side of the story: liberalization in the United States 
under CAFTA.  There are very few commodities for which CAFTA grants increased 
access to the US market for the simple reason that the CAFTA countries already have 
tariff free access for most products under the CBI and the CBTPA.  But there are some, 
the most important of which are sugar, beef, peanuts, dairy and textiles.  We report the 
treatment of these commodities under CAFTA in Table 7. Note that the quota for sugar is 
technically a TRQ, but since the out of quota tariff is prohibitive, (over 100%) and since 
this tariff will not be reduced, the quotas shown in the table are in effect an absolute limit  












Beef Costa  Rica  D  10536   26.4% 
Beef El  Salvador  D  105   26.4% 
Beef Honduras D  525   26.4% 
Beef Nicaragua  D  10500   26.4% 
Sugar Costa  Rica H 15796 11000   >100% 
Sugar   El  Salvador  H  27379 24000   >100% 
Sugar Honduras  H 10530 8000   >100% 
Sugar Nicaragua H 22114 22000   >100% 
Sugar Guatemala H 50546 32000   >100% 
Peanuts El  Salvador  E  500   131-164% 
Peanuts Nicaragua  E  10000   131-164% 
Peanuts  Rest of CA  E  ---    na 
Milk  Costa Rica  F  407461 ltrs 5%  77 cents/ltr 
Milk  El Salvador  F  366715 ltrs 5%  77 cents/ltr 
Milk  Honduras  F  560259 ltrs 5%  77 cents/ltr 
Milk  Nicaragua  F  254663 ltrs 5%  77 cents/ltr 
Milk  Guatemala  F  305596 ltrs 5%  77 cents/ltr 
Ice Cream  Costa Rica  F  67087 ltrs 5%  50 cents/kg + 17%
Ice Cream  El Salvador  F  77670 ltrs 5%  50 cents/kg + 17%
Ice Cream  Honduras  F  48544 ltrs 5%  50 cents/kg + 17%
Ice Cream  Nicaragua  F  266989 ltrs 5%  50 cents/kg + 17%
Costa Rica  F  550 5%  Various 
El Salvador  F  630 5%  Various 
Honduras F  450 5%  Various 





Milk Guatemala  F  750 5%  Various 
Source:  CAFTA agreement and US Trade Representative Fact Sheets.   34
on the amount that can be exported from each of the Central American countries.  How 
important will liberalized treatment of exports to the United States from CAFTA be to 
producers of these commodities in Central America? 
In addition to the quotas shown in Table 7, under CAFTA the US will eliminate 
tariffs on tobacco over 15 years, except where current duty treatment under the CBI 
grants duty-free access.  For those products the tariff will be set to zero immediately.  For 
ethanol, duty-free access into the US market under CBI will not change.  In addition El 
Salvador was granted a share of the non-local stock TRQ not to exceed 10% of the total 
TRQ and Costa Rica was granted a fixed share of the non-local stock TRQ of 31,000 
gallons (15% of the regional TRQ) with no growth.   
Sugar:  Sugar is one of the most highly protected and highly subsidized products grown 
in the United States.  Each Central American country had a TRQ prior to CAFTA.   
Imports above the TRQ are stopped by a prohibitive out of quota tariff of 33-35 cents per 
kilo which is higher than the market price of sugar.  CAFTA approximately doubles the 
TRQ for each of the countries (Table 8).  This expansion of quotas is undoubtedly 
valuable for Central America.  At the current price of sugar (about $240 per ton) the new 
quotas are worth about $24 million to the region.  But when one compares the additional 
quotas with the level of current production of sugar in the region, it is clear that they will 
not have much of an effect on producers since they amount to less than 1% of total 
supply in each of the five countries.  CAFTA does not significantly expand the US 
market for Central American sugar.     
 









Costa  Rica  15796 13000  16860 3614579 
El  Salvador  27379 24000  36040 4769315 
Guatemala 50546  32000  49820  17119300 
Honduras 10530  8000  10240  4147750 
Nicaragua  22114 22000  28160 3347787 
Source:  CAFTA agreement for quotas and Todd et al for production.   35
Beef:  The United States' 26 percent out-of-quota tariff on beef will be phased out over a 
15-year period. TRQ access will be established for the following countries. The CAFTA 
TRQ will open only if the existing WTO TRQ fills. 
Costa Rica: TRQ of 10,340 MT, growing at 5 percent per year 
El Salvador: TRQ of 100 MT, growing at 5 percent per year 
Honduras: TRQ of 500 MT, growing at 5 percent per year 
Nicaragua: TRQ of 10,000 MT, growing at 5 percent per year 
At the end of 15 years there will be unlimited access and no tariff on imports.  At 
present Costa Rica and Nicaragua are the only two countries with significant meat 
exports to the United States, averaging $22-24 million per year over the period 1998-
2002.  For both of these countries, the increase in TRQs appears to be significant.   
Between 2000 and 2003 according to the FAO, Costa Rica’s annual production of beef 
was around 75,000 metric tons, and Nicargua’s was 58,000 metric tons. (Todd et al. p.7). 
Thus the new TRQs amount to an expansion of between 13% and 16% of the domestic 
market.  Since both countries now export to the US, it should be possible to expand 
production to take advantage of this market opening, particularly since the TRQs will be 
expanding relatively rapidly at the same time that the 26% tariff is falling at about two 
percentage points per year.   
Textiles (Maquila):  Textiles are an area of potentially large benefits but equally large 
and uncertain risks because of the expiration of the Multifiber Agreement in January 
2005.   In the past, (before 2000) in Central America maquila was almost entirely limited 
to the assembly of clothing from imported inputs.  Recall the situation facing this 
industry prior to CAFTA. From 1984, with the passage of the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act, the maquila industry was exempted from the world-wide quota system 
then in force.  But its products were not exempt from U.S. tariffs until the passage of the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act in 1990. With the passage of   
NAFTA in 1994  Mexican producers gained a significant advantage over producers in 
Central America because they got quota-free and tariff free access to the US market, and   36
more generous rules of origin denied to producers in Central America.  This  advantage 
was eliminated by the CBTPA passed in 2000.  It extended to the Central American 
countries the market access conditions for maquila granted to Mexico under NAFTA with 
similar liberalized restrictions on rules of origen.  Imports of knitted or shaped apparel 
were permitted free of tariffs provided that the intermediate inputs from the yarn forward 
were produced in a CAFTA country.
12 This has had a major impact on production in 
Central America as we shall see in a moment. But note also that the CBTPA has a sunset 
provision.  It will expire in 2008 unless CAFTA is implemented 
What CAFTA does for textiles is to make permanent the liberalized rules of 
origen for inputs to the maquila industry granted temporarily under the CBTPA. It has 
also further liberalized the rules of origin for a number of apparel products by extending 
tariff-free access to products wholly produced in CAFTA countries or produced with 
non-CAFTA fibers.
13   This has turned out to be a big stimulus to cotton production and 
to the intermediate textile products such as yarn, thread and fabrics. Already there has 
been an expansion of cotton production in several Central American countries.   
However there is a potentially serious problem affecting the potential benefits 
from CAFTA for textiles and their inputs and that is the elimination of the MFA quota 
system on January 1, 2005.  This has led to a big surge of clothing exports from China to 
the United States.  It is unclear whether Central American clothing producers will be able 
to compete with Chinese products.  They do retain a tariff advantage over the Chinese in 
the US market, but that may be insufficient to offset Chinese cost advantages either in the 
manufacture of clothing or in the cost of inputs.  We simply do not know yet what the 
outcome will be of this new world-wide competition for the US market.   
We do know that the question is critical to the future.  Maquila has become a 
leading export in every Central American country with the exception of Costa Rica where 
Intel and other products dominate the export picture.  Some idea of how big maquila has 
                                                 
12 Tee shirts and socks were subject to a maximum tariff-free import ceiling. 
13 This means that products do not have to be made with US yarn or cotton.  CAFTA also raised the 
minimum permissible value of non-CAFTA inputs from 7% to 10% of the final product.   37
become in Central America is given by the data for 2002 displayed in Table 9.  The 
export of clothing comprises around 60% of total exports in Honduras and El Salvador 
and around 40% in Nicaragua and Guatemala.   











   Total World 
Costa Rica  769,209  450,910  10.11%  1.9% 
El Salvador  1,789,206  205,676  57.07%  11.1% 
Guatemala  1,776,381  453,599  35.66%  5.7% 
Honduras  2,648,637  45,473  60.11%  39.5% 
Nicaragua  455,085  35,844  39.55%  10.5% 
Source:  ERS data 
Data in thousands of dollars 
Imports are sitc 26+65+84, textile fiber, yarn, fabric and clothing 
 
Gross exports undoubtedly overstate the contribution of maquila to the economies 
of Central America because some fraction of the total value of production had to be 
imported either from the US or elsewhere.  In the table we show a crude estimate of total 
imported inputs which we have approximated as the sum of the imports in SITC codes 
#26, textile fiber, #65 which includes, yarn, thread and fabrics and SITC 84 which is 
clothing.
14 The difference which we call value added and compare with GDP in the 
righthand column of Table 9 is an approximation of the direct and indirect contribution of 
maquila to national income.  As the reader can see from the table, maquila is particularly 
important in Honduras where it comprises 20% of industrial employment, 60 % of 
exports and as much as 39% of GDP.
15 It is less important in the other four countries but 
                                                 
14 Some imports to maquila in some countries, are put under miscellaneous.(SITC 89)  In El Salvador we 
know that this is the case.  Including SITC 89 for El Salvador increases imports by $73 million, but only 
cuts the contribution of maquila to GDP by .5%.     
15 Employment estimate was taken from  Latin America Press Organization, May 6, 2005.  The figures for 
GDP in current dollars were taken from the World Bank database.  We compare the value of the national 
contribution to maquila to GDP rather than manufacturing because some part of the gross value of maquila 
production must have been drawn from domestic agriculture and services.  If we had included all of   38
still it comprises around 10% of GDP in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 5% in Guatemala 
but only 2% in Costa Rica.  In short this is an important sector both for employment, and 
for the foreign exchange it generates.  As we will see now, it is also important as a market 
for import substitution in inputs that had to be imported prior to CAFTA.   
The Caribbean Trade Preference Act (CBTPA) went into effect in 2000.  The act 
was intended to level the playing field between Mexican and Central American clothing 
producers by giving Central American producers the same liberalized rules of origin to 
inputs enjoyed by Mexican producers after NAFTA.  Table 10 documents the powerful 
positive effect of the act, especially in Honduras, El Salvador Nicaragua and Guatemala.  
In the 1990s prior to the passage of the act, each country imported intermediate inputs 
amounting to between one half to over two thirds of the value of maquila exports.  After 
year 2000 those imports fell sharply in every country, but particularly in Honduras, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador even though the total value of exports continued to rise quite 
rapidly.  Those intermediate inputs did not shift from the US to some other suppliers.  
Rather it appears that in each country domestic suppliers were able to successfully move  
                                                                                                                                                 
miscellaneous manufactured imports as going to maquila, the contribution to GDP would have fallen by 
less than one percentage point.     39
Table 10.  Intermediate Imports to Maquila and Exports of Maquila to the US (000s) 






















1989 0.6218  $337,875.00  0.8163  $138,202.00 0.7470  $88,764.00     0.9763    $43,814.00 
1990 0.5801  397,396.00 0.7304  203,152.00 0.7526  115,972.00     0.8107  56,195.00 
1991 0.6213  453,874.00 0.6368  350,886.00 0.6474  201,728.00 3.29    1,254.00 0.7144  93,719.00 
1992 0.6010  607,103.00  0.7292  477,870.00 0.5551  377,220.00 1.48    3,627.00 0.5750  171,667.00 
1993 0.6124  671,935.00  0.7867  573,916.00 0.5009 522,149.00 0.55   11,464.00 0.5087 259,651.00 
1994 0.6349  704,679.00  0.7802  623,632.00 0.5249 666,270.00 0.34   29,721.00 0.4660 411,762.00 
1995 0.6195  777,931.00  0.7894  714,076.00 0.5263 955,968.00 0.23   76,501.00 0.5138 600,254.00 
1996 0.7197  721,992.00  0.7792  831,629.00 0.5968 1,267,559.00 0.19   146,112.00 0.4800  740,099.00 
1997 0.7070  869,141.00  0.7135  1,001,814.00 0.5634  1,725,44900  0.21   186,623.00 0.4909 1,077,950.00 
1998 0.7629  839,706.00  0.6154  1,183,679.00 0.6236 1,946,140.00 0.20   237,407.00 0.5344 1,198,861.00 
1999 0.6089  846,579.00  0.4010  1,280,196.00 0.5497 2,243,648.00 0.21   284,056.00 0.4289 1,360,733.00 
2000 0.4130  846,841.57  0.0711  1,545,178.77 0.0090 2,463,275.16 0.04   345,849.37 0.0522 1,640,939.21 
2001  0.3965  791,031.62  0.0602   1,677,452.78 0.0077  2,485,702.66 0.03   390,607.98 0.0611  1,671,170.31 
2002  0.3667  747,225.75  0.1492   1,727,038.17 0.0076  2,556,299.31 0.03   445,767.42 0.0496  1,712,661.46 
Source, ERS data   
Note:  Intermediate inputs are the sum of sitc 26+65+84.  
 
 back up the supply chain increasing dramatically the domestic content of maquila 
exports.  
Table 10 also documents the rapid growth of the entire maquila industry since 
1989, particularly in Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Most of this growth came 
from expanding trade with the United States.  One can see that for the year 2002 by 
comparing maquila exports to the US in 2002 from this table with maquila exports to the 
entire world for the year 2002 shown in Table 9.  In none of the five Central American 
countries is the US/Total export ratio less than 95%.  Of equal significance, this industry 
now comprises an important part of total industrial activity and total exports in each of 
the four countries other than Costa Rica and even there maquila contributes 6.5% of total 
industrial value added.
16  The normal procedure for measuring the impact of a change in 
tariffs is to compare the tariff structure before and after the change.  This is what forms 
the basis of counterfactural calculations.  For maquila this procedure is inadequate.  As 
discussed above, CAFTA makes permanent the rules of origin regulations put into effect 
under the CBTPA passed in year 2000.  Those liberalized rules of origin for the inputs 
into clothing exported to the United States from Central America will expire in 2008 in 
the event that CAFTA is not implemented.  Thus for maquila CAFTA does not just 
liberalize.  Rather its biggest effect is to make permanent liberalization granted earlier 
under the CBTPA.  Central American maquila producers will not be made better off than 
they are now by having CAFTA.  Rather they are better off than they would be after 2008 
when the CBTPA expires if CAFTA is not in place.   
This is not a trivial matter.  Indeed the advantages made permanent under CAFTA 
to the maquila industry may well be the single most important benefit of CAFTA to 
Central America.  As we have already pointed out, the ratio of imports of intermediates 
from the US to exports of maquila to the US dropped dramatically after 2000.  For 
example, in 2002 if the import ratios for exports to the United States had been what they 
were in 1995  the drop in the domestic value of production would have amounted to 1% 
                                                 
16 Maquila comprises between one and two thirds of total exports and  around one-third of industrial 
activity.  It is particularly important in Honduras and El Salvador.   41
in Costa Rica, 3% in Nicaragua, about 5% in Guatemala and El Salvador and 20% in 
Honduras.
17    
Other U.S. Tariff Reductions:  Because the United States granted many products tariff 
free access to the US market under the CBI and the CBTPA, many have assumed that 
tariff reductions under CAFTA were primarily granted by the Central American countries 
and not by the United States.  While that may well be true in general and for industrial 
products, it is a misleading picture for agriculture and agroindustrial products.  There are 
currently many exceptions to tariff free-entry to the U.S. market, some of which are 
eliminated under CAFTA.   
Here we are interested in changes that could have a significant positive impact on 
export potential for Central America.  Obviously, not all trade liberalization will make a 
difference to Central American exporters because they may not be competitive in the 
United States even with zero tariffs.  To find areas of potential export expansion we 
should first look at products which are already competitive in world trade, even if they 
are not exported to the United States.  Indeed we should concentrate on those products 
where Central American exporters are able to sell in the rest of the world, but not in the 
United States, presumably because they have faced some sort of trade or phytosanitary 
barrier.  Among all such products we should then look at those which were exempted 
from the CBI and CBTPA and whose tariffs were eliminated by CAFTA.  This is the 
subset of products which should enjoy a particularly strong positive impact from 
CAFTA. 
Monge et al (2004) have made a disaggregated (at the 8 digit SITC level) list of 
sectors which satisfy the first two of these criteria.  Each of the products on the list has a 
revealed comparative advantage in trade with the world but not in the United States.  That 
is, their share of exports to the world is higher than average for their country and their 
share of exports to the United States is lower than average.  The list was prepared to give 
the negotiators of the agreement a clear idea of products for which the evidence 
                                                 
17 To get this estimate we took the value of exports to the US in 2002 and applied the ratio of intermediate 
inputs imported from the US in 1995.  All calculations used ERS data at the two digit SITRC level.     42
suggested the existence of barriers to entry in the US market.  Altogether they found 136 
such products for Costa Rica comprising 10.7% of total exports, 116 for El Salvador 
comprising 6% of exports, 181 for Guatemala and 9% of exports, 75 for Honduras and 
8% of exports and 82 for Nicaragua amounting to 35% of total exports.   
Apparently this list had an effect on the negotiations.  To see this we matched the 
products on the list with the tariff treatment by the United States under the U.S. tariff 
annex to the CAFTA agreement.  We found that 159 of the products on the lists of the 
five countries were either on the US A list or were granted TRQs under the agreement.   
These are products that had tariff protection before CAFTA which will be eliminated 
over the next decade under CAFTA.  An additional 126 had zero tariffs prior to CAFTA 
which implies that the lack of Central American exports was due either to phytosanitary 
or other barriers or to US competitiveness in these products.   
Production for many of the products on Monge’s list that will get tariff reductions 
or free entry under CAFTA is small.  While these commodities may well represent 
promising areas for future export expansion, we focus on products with at least $1 
million in average exports to the world in the period 1998-2000 and which are in either 
the A or G tariff categories or which were granted a TRQ.  Table 11 displays a list of 
these products.  These are products with significant exports in which the country has a 
revealed comparative advantage in its exports to the world but not to the United States.  
All of the products shown in the table will either have tariff free access to the US market 
or TRQs under CAFTA.  The table also indicates which of the commodities were 
excluded from the CBI.  Since we are interested in products for which the changes under 
CAFTA could lead to an expansion of exports to the United States we have excluded 
several dairy products from the Nicaragua list since the heavy subsidy to dairy in the 
United States makes it unlikely that this will be a promising market opening for 
Nicaraguan farmers.  We also eliminated tobacco and cigarettes from Guatemala’s list 
because of the special circumstances of this market in the United States.   
The table shows the products which presumably are ready to take advantage of a 
market opening in the United States.  Except for Costa Rica, the absolute amount of Table 11.  Competitive Products with Market Opening under CAFTA 







Costa Rica  in millions        
 2031100  944  x A pork meat
 3034200  1123  x G tuna
 3052000  1606  x G,A fish eggs and livers
 5111000  2224  x G bull semen
 8045010  4361  A mangoes fresh
 8071900  62757  A other fruit
 12071010  5963  x G plam nuts
 15111000  33566  x G palm oil
 16041300  6042  x G,A sardines
 17041000  2339  A chewing gum
 19053000  14585  x G sweet crackers and wafers 
 20097090  1188  x nc concentrate of apple juice 
 21069030  41695  Q preparations for beverages 
 Total    178393 
El Salvador   
 3023900  1090  x G,A fresh tuna
 9023000  1285  x A black tea
 15179090  1117  A food preparations based on animal or vegetable 
 17019900  2597  Q saccarin
 19021900  1659  x A pastas -wo eggs
 21039000  2882  Q prep for sauces
 23099020  2114  x nc birdfood
 Total  12744 
Guatemala   
 4090000  1773  A honey
 7020000  6078  A fresh tomatoes
 7096010  1940  A peppers
 10051000  2644  x G seed
 11041200  2953  A oat flour
 12074010  4254  x G sesame seed
 15179090  3872  A food preps based on animal or veg oils
 19021900  2412  x A pastas w/oeggs
 19041000  28919  A toasted grain-based products 
 19059000  10547  x A biscuits, pastries bread 
 21021090  1593  A other prepared foods 
 22089010  2142  x G ethyl alcohol-called bitters in US translation
 Total  69127 
Honduras   
 7082000  1267  G,A beans
 7133200  7594  A red beans
 15119010  1414  x A palm oil
 17049000  4438  G,A confeccions of sugar 
 20055900  1319  A conserved vegetables 
 20094000  4366  A pineapple juice
 20097010  4471  x nc concentrate of apple juice 
 Total  24869 
Nicaragua   
 1029000  15982  G live cows
 2011000  4712  Q beef carcasses
 4063000  2964  Q cheese
 12074010  1197  x G sesame seeds
 Total  24855 
 Grand  Total  309988 
Source: Monge et al (2004) and author worksheets. 
Note: Q-quota, nc-product not covered by agreement  44
production in these products is small.  In total they amount to around $310 million for the 
five countries compared to total agricultural and processed agricultural commodities 
including maquila exports from those countries of over $21 billion.
18 Thus one might 
conclude that the market opening is unlikely to have much of a positive impact on 
Central American farmers.  But that ignores possible dynamic considerations.  In the first 
place, given the size of the U.S. market it is possible that over a period of time there 
could be an expansion in production in a sector with a revealed comparative advantage 
many times larger than current sales to the rest of the world.  Second, as we have seen, 
the U.S. also reduced tariffs on a large number of products, some of which are not 
currently particularly competitive in world markets.  But improved market access in the 
U.S. could trigger a process of productivity-increasing investments to make other sectors 
competitive in the U.S. market.  Thus the procedure that generated Table 11 is 
undoubtedly too narrow, both because it ignores dynamic induced investments in sectors 
which are currently exporting to the rest of the world, and because it ignores the potential 
impact of U.S. tariff reductions in other sectors.   
 
                                                 
18 This is for 2002, the latest year for which we have detailed data for agricultural exports by commodity.   45
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the concerns of some and the positive expectations of others, a careful 
analysis of the CAFTA treaty suggests that in the short run at least, the impact of its trade 
liberalization components is likely to be small.  There are several reasons for this.  First, 
for the Central American countries tariffs are already quite low, especially for non-
agricultural products.  Second, for sensitive products in agriculture, the reductions in 
tariffs were intentionally designed to be gradual, or in several cases, non-existent.  In the 
short run TRQ’s could potentially have a bigger impact than tariff reductions on domestic 
producers in agriculture.  But we show that the actual TRQs granted by the Central 
American countries in almost every case are either less than the current level of imports 
or small relative to current domestic supply.  That means that neither the TRQs nor tariff 
reductions are likely to cause significant price reductions for most agricultural 
commodities in the region, especially in the short run. 
Since the U.S. already grants tariff-free access under the CBI, on its face trade 
liberalization in the CAFTA treaty appears to be asymmetric, with most of the tariff 
reductions being granted by the Central American countries.  That is misleading for two 
reasons.  First there really were some significant tariff barriers in the United States for 
agricultural commodities under the CBI.  Many of these are removed under CAFTA. For 
example significant TRQs were granted to Costa Rica and Nicaragua for beef and to 
Nicaragua for peanuts. In addition tariffs were eliminated for a number of other products 
in which Central America appears to have a comparative advantage judging by non-US 
exports.    
Second, the current favorable special treatment of the five Central American 
countries under the CBTPA and the CBI will expire in 2008 if CAFTA is not 
implemented. CAFTA makes permanent the tariff concessions of the CBI and the 
liberalized rules of origin of the CBTPA.  That is particularly important for the maquila 
industry. CAFTA does not represent much of a change from current arrangements, but it 
does represent significant trade liberalization relative to what the situation might   46
otherwise be after 2008 when the CBTPA has expired.  This may be the most important 
concession in the Treaty. But it is impossible at present to know how much that is likely 
to mean to the maquila industry because CAFTA roughly coincides with the end of the 
Multifiber Agreement  The end of the MFA quota system may permit Chinese or Asian 
exports to sweep Central American producers of clothing out of the U.S. market in spite 
of CAFTA’s liberalization of the rules of origin on inputs to the industry.   
The fact that the tariff reductions and TRQs granted by the Central American 
countries under CAFTA will not cause significant price reductions does not mean that 
domestic producers will be unaffected by the agreement.  In the long run the level of 
protection of many important commodities such as rice, pork and poultry will be 
significantly lower. But the tariff reductions in these sectors are gradual.
19 That gives 
farmers time to adjust and to become more competitive.  What will be critical from a 
policy perspective is that this time is used wisely to increase productivity, switch to more 
profitable crops and take advantage of the new opportunities opened up by CAFTA. That 
will require a significant investments in research, training and infrastructure.  As a first 
step a serious effort needs to be made to examine the production inefficiencies and 
marketing bottlenecks for the commodities which either are or could be produced by 
small holders using a micro-based market chain analysis.  Such an analysis could identify 
specific commodities with market potential under CAFTA and it would give 
policymakers the information they need to formulate policy measures and investment 
plans to help the agriculture sector take advantage of the expanded market opportunities 
under CAFTA as well as to meet the long run threat of lower protection that will be faced 
by Central American farmers. 
 
                                                 
19 Dairy and beans could also face significantly lower protection but that depends mainly on the 
administration of safeguards in the case of beans and on competition between US and other international 
suppliers in the case of dairy   47
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